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N Day & Co. v. Texiand Petroleum, Inc. I the Texas Supreme Court, in a
landmark decision,2 changed the law of Texas applicable to the executive
right 3 by holding that such is a property right, not a power of appoint-
ment, and therefore is conveyed along with the mineral estate under a gen-
eral warranty deed unless expressly reserved.
4
Mildred Keaton and Franceli Young conveyed eighty acres of land by
warranty deed to Day & Company. Keaton and Young reserved an undi-
vided one-half mineral interest, but expressly conveyed the executive right in
the entire tract to Day & Company. Day & Company later conveyed ten
acres out of the eighty-acre tract to John and Genelda Shoaf by warranty
deed, excepting and reserving an undivided one-fourth mineral interest. The
deed also excepted the one-half mineral interest previously reserved to Kea-
ton and Young, but was silent as to the executive right to the ten acres. Day
& Company and the Shoafs executed separate mineral leases to the same
lessee, who later assigned its leases to Texland. Day & Company, believing
that Texland's predecessor in interest had failed to pay delay rentals to Kea-
ton and Young in order to maintain its lease covering Keaton and Young's
nonexecutive mineral interest, attempted to exercise the executive right to
this interest by executing a new lease to Bobby Day, the president of Day &
Company.
Day & Company then brought suit against Texland and the Shoafs seek-
ing a judicial declaration that Day & Company owned three-fourths of the
executive right to the minerals under the ten-acre tract, and that the lease
from Day & Company to Day was valid. The trial court granted Texland's
motion for summary judgment, holding that the lease assigned to Texland
was valid as to the eighty mineral acres and that the executive right to half
the minerals in the ten-acre tract, which had previously been severed and
conveyed to Day & Company, passed under the warranty deed to the
* B.A., St. Olaf College; J.D., Southern Methodist University. Attorney at Law, Stras-
burger & Price, Dallas, Texas.
1. 786 S.W.2d 667 (Tex. 1990):
2. On motion for rehearing the supreme court withdrew its previous opinion and judg-
ment. 32 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 549 (July 12, 1989), withdrawn, 786 S.W.2d 667 (Tex. 1990).
3. The executive right is the exclusive power to execute oil and gas leases. 2 H. WIL-
LIAMS & C. MEYERS, OIL AND GAS LAW § 338 (1990).
4. 786 S.W.2d at 669-70.
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Shoafs. 5 Accordingly, the trial court declared the Shoafs to be the holders of
an undivided three-fourths interest and Day & Company to be the holder of
the remaining one-fourth interest in the executive right.6 The court of ap-
peals affirmed the lower court's judgment, holding that the executive right
severed from Keaton and Young's one-half mineral interest had passed to
the Shoafs under the general warranty deed from Day & Company because
the executive right was "so significantly and intimately connected with the
mineral estate as to be within the general rule that a warranty deed passes all
the estate owned by the grantor at the time of the conveyance unless there
are reservations or exceptions which reduce the estate conveyed."' 7
On appeal to the supreme court, Day & Company argued that the court of
appeals erred in treating the severed executive right as an incident of the
mineral estate which can be conveyed by implication as a result of a failure
to except the right from the granting clause of a general warranty deed. Re-
lying on the supreme court's decision in Pan American Petroleum Corp. v.
Cain,8 Day & Company claimed that a severed executive right was in the
nature of a power that could be conveyed only by an express assignment
under applicable principles of contract law. In Cain the court described the
executive right as a power, stating that "a power is an authority given to
dispose of real or personal property of which the donor has the right of
disposition ... [and] is not an estate in the property, and its scope and extent
is governed by the instrument creating it." 9
In Day the court recanted its analysis in Cain 10 and held that the execu-
tive right is an interest in property which is incident to and part of the min-
eral estate, like other attributes such as bonus, royalty and delay rentals.II
The court overruled its opinion in Cain to the extent it conflicted with the
Day holding.12 Applying this analysis to the instant case, the court found
that the executive right, severed from the one-half mineral interest reserved
by Keaton and Young and conveyed to Day & Company, passed under Day
& Company's general warranty deed to the Shoafs because Day & Company
did not reserve or except such interest from the conveyance.' 3
5. Id. at 667-68.
6. IM
7. 718 S.W.2d 384, 389 (rex. App.-Amarillo 1986), aff'd, 786 S.W.2d 667 (rex. 1990).
8. 163 Tex. 323, 355 S.W.2d 506 (1962).
9. Id.; 355 S.W.2d at 510 (quoting Hupp v. Union Coal & Coke Co., 284 Pa. 529, 530,
131 A. 364, 365 (1925)).
10. According to the Texas Supreme Court:
We erred in Cain when we compared the executive right to a power of appoint-
ment. Although the executive right is similar to a power, it is not a product of
contract, but rather a creature of property rights. Even when it is severed from
the other rights or attributes incident to the mineral estate, it remains an interest
in property. As the dissent in Cain correctly noted, the executive right reserved
by the grantor "was a property right, an interest in land appurtenant to the
mineral interest therein conveyed, and for the use and benefit of the mineral
interest retained and owned by [the grantor]."
786 S.W.2d 667, 669 (rex. 1990) (citations omitted).
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id. at 669-70.
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The remaining issue on appeal concerned the validity of the mineral lease
between Day & Company and Bobby Day covering the entire eighty acres
with respect to the nonexecutive mineral interest owned by Keaton and
Young. Although Day & Company had previously leased these minerals to
Texland's predecessor in interest, Day & Company claimed that such lease
terminated when Texland's predecessor failed to pay Keaton and Young de-
lay rentals. Prior to the lease between Day & Company and Day, however,
Keaton and Young accepted late payment of delay rentals and ratified in
writing the lease to Texland's predecessor in interest. The supreme court
held that the lease to Texland's predecessor in interest was the superior lease
because it had been executed, recorded, and revived prior to the lease to
Day.14
In Smith v. Williams Is the Texas Supreme Court confirmed existing Texas
law by holding that the execution of an instrument conveying a note and a
lien and "all liens and titles held by the grantor in and to said land" does not
as a matter of law convey a severed mineral estate owned by the grantor in
the property. 16
In Smith Wolcott Gin, Inc., a company owned by Terry Smith, conveyed
the mineral estate in three tracts of land to Smith. At the same time, Smith
sold his stock in the company. The purchaser of the stock executed a prom-
issory note to Smith secured by a deed of trust covering the three tracts.
Smith later transferred the note and the lien to the Plains National Bank of
Lubbock to secure an unrelated debt. The instrument transferring the lien
stated that Smith was transferring the note, the lien, and "all liens and titles
held by [Smith] in and to said land." 17 Smith subsequently defaulted on the
debt, and the bank foreclosed its lien and purchased the property. The bank
later conveyed the land to a third party who sued Smith seeking a declara-
tory judgment that Smith's transfer of lien also conveyed title to Smith's
mineral estate in the land.
In accord with its decisions in Humphries-Mexia Co. v. Gammon Is and
Carminati v. Fenoglio,19 the supreme court held that as a matter of law the
transfer of the lien assigned the note and the lien reserved to secure it as well
as the legal title retained by Smith for the same purpose, but did not convey
the mineral estate Smith had reserved. 20 In reaching this conclusion, the
court reasoned that the reference to "said land" in the instrument by which
Smith transferred the note and the lien to the bank referred to the surface
estate to which the lien had attached and did not include the mineral estate,
which the lien had never covered.21
14. Id. at 670.
15. 786 S.W.2d 665 (rex. 1990).
16. Id. at 666.
17. IM at 665.
18. 113 Tex. 247, 254 S.W. 296 (1923).
19. 267 S.W.2d 449 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1954, writ ref'd n.r.e.).




In Prairie Producing Co. v. Schlachter22 the Texarkana court of appeals
held that a certain deed conveyed a mineral interest, not a royalty interest,
on the basis that the deed's granting clause, as a matter of law, granted a fee
interest in the minerals in place.23
This case arose from a 1934 deed executed by Mrs. J. H. Riner and Mr. B.
E. Riner and wife, as grantors, to R. R. McDonald, as grantee, conveying an
interest in two tracts of land situated in Wood County, Texas. The instru-
ment was entitled "Mineral Deed." The granting clause of the instrument
provided that it conveyed "an undivided one-half interest in and to all of the
oil, gas and other minerals in and under and that may be produced from the
land described." 24
The interest conveyed under the deed ultimately became vested in eight
different parties, six of whom leased their respective undivided interests to
Prairie Producing Company in 1986. David and Mona Schlachter ulti-
mately acquired an undivided three-fourths of the interest reserved by the
Riners and leased the interest in 1983 to a corporation that they owned. The
Schlachters filed suit against Prairie Producing Company seeking a declara-
tory judgment that the 1934 deed conveyed a royalty interest. Prairie Pro-
ducing Company counterclaimed, seeking a declaration that the deed
conveyed a mineral interest.
The court began its construction of the 1934 deed by noting that the
granting clause contained classic language conveying a fee interest in the
minerals in place. 25 The court continued by noting the five attributes of a
severed mineral estate: 1) the right to explore and develop (the right of in-
gress and egress); 2) the right to lease (the executive right); 3) the right to
receive bonus payments; 4) the right to receive delay rentals; and 5) the right
to receive royalty.26 Of these attributes, the court concluded that all had
passed under the 1934 deed except the right to delay rentals and the right to
bonus monies. 27 According to the court, the reservation of these attributes
was not inconsistent with the conveyance of a mineral interest considering
the nature of the rights expressly granted and reserved under the deed. 28
The court emphasized, for example, that the right of ingress and egress for
the purpose of mining and drilling, a classic attribute of mineral estate own-
ership, had been conveyed under the deed, thus indicating an intention to
convey a mineral estate.29 Likewise, the fact that the right to receive rentals
and bonuses had been withheld was significant to the court. It reasoned that
if the parties had intended to convey a royalty interest under the deed, there
would have been no need to reserve rentals and bonuses since the royalty
interest does not share in those items unless the conveyance or reservation
22. 786 S.W.2d 409 (rex. App.-Texarkana 1990, writ denied).
23. Id. at 411.
24. Id.
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specifically provides otherwise.30
On these bases, the court held that the clearly expressed intent of the par-
ties contained in the deed's granting clause was determinative of the issue
and compelled the conclusion that the deed conveyed a mineral interest and
not a mere royalty interest.31
Krenek v. Texstar North America, Inc.32 involved an application of the
common law "strip and gore" doctrine. The Corpus Christi court of appeals
held that the plaintiffs had previously conveyed their interest in a twenty-
four-acre strip of land by implication when they conveyed title to the tracts
adjoining the strip on either side.33 In Krenek appellants' parents owned a
236-acre tract of land. By two separate conveyances, one in 1965 and the
other in 1967, appellants' parents conveyed the surface of a twenty-four-acre
strip to the State of Texas for use as a highway, waiving all rights of ingress
and egress to the surface but retaining the mineral interest underlying the
strip. The twenty-four-acre strip ran through the center of the 236-acre tract
and eventually became part of Highway 59. In 1971, the appellants' mother
died testate (their father having predeceased her). In her will, she devised
the 106.88 acres lying west of Highway 59 to her son Victor and the 105.03
acres lying east of Highway 59 to her daughter Dorothy. The mineral estate
underlying the twenty-four-acre strip was not expressly devised. Victor, act-
ing as the executor of his mother's estate, executed deeds to himself and to
his sister conveying the acreage described in the will. The mineral interest to
the twenty-four-acre strip was not conveyed by either deed. Victor and Dor-
othy subsequently conveyed the surface and minerals of their tracts by deeds
containing metes and bounds descriptions to the edge of the highway. Tex-
star acquired a lease on the 106.88-acre tract and drilled a producing well.
Thereafter, Victor and Dorothy sued Texstar for drainage of the twenty-
four-acre strip, alleging ownership of the underlying minerals.
The strip and gore doctrine is a well-established rule of common law in
Texas which provides that, absent an express reservation to the contrary, a
conveyance of land bounded by a public highway carries with it the fee to
the center of the road as part of the grant.34 This presumption of intent to
convey title to the center of the highway applies if the appurtenant strip
exists at the time of the conveyance and is not overcome by the fact that the
deed describes the abutting land by metes and bounds extending to the edge
of the highway. 35 The doctrine does not apply, however, if the grantor owns
land abutting both sides of the strip36 or if the strip is larger and more valua-
ble than the conveyed tract.37
30. Id. at 412-13.
31. Id. at 414.
32. 787 S.W.2d 566 (Tex. App.--Corpus Christi 1990, writ denied).
33. Id. at 569.
34. Id at 568; see also State v. Williams, 161 Tex. 1, 335 S.W.2d 834, 836 (1960); Gold-
smith v. Humble Oil & Refining Co., 145 Tex. 549, 199 S.W.2d 773, 775 (1947).
35. 787 S.W.2d at 568-69; see also State v. Williams, 335 S.W.2d at 836.
36. 787 S.W.2d at 569; see also Rio Bravo Oil Co. v. Weed, 121 Tex. 427, 50 S.W.2d 1080,
1083 (1932), cert. denied, 288 U.S. 603 (1933).
37. 787 S.W.2d at 569; see also Angelo v. Biscamp, 441 S.W.2d 524, 527 (Tex. 1969).
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The court of appeals applied the strip and gore doctrine and concluded
that Victor and Dorothy had conveyed the twenty-four mineral acres under-
lying the highway when they conveyed the adjoining acreage lying on either
side of the highway, and therefore had no standing to assert a claim against
Texstar for drainage.38 The court reasoned that: 1) the deeds executed by
Victor and Dorothy conveyed tracts abutting an existing highway using a
metes and bounds description to the edge of the highway; 2) the abutting
tracts did not have a common grantor at the time of those conveyances be-
cause Victor owned the acreage west of the highway and Dorothy owned the
acreage east of the highway; and 3) the twenty-four-acre strip was not larger
than the conveyed tracts.39 Having considered these factors, the court held,
as a matter of law, that appellants had conveyed the strip when they con-
veyed the abutting acreage, and therefore owned no mineral interest that
could be drained by Texstar.4°
Luckel v. White41 involved the construction of a future lease clause con-
tained in a 1935 royalty deed. Under the deed, Mary Etta Mayes granted to
L. C. Luckel, Jr., his heirs and assigns, an undivided 1/32nd royalty interest
in and to a certain tract of land. The grant was made subject to an existing
oil and gas lease and provided that the grantee was entitled to 1/4th of any
and all royalties paid under such lease. The deed further provided that
Mayes reserved the executive right as well as the right to all bonuses and
rentals paid under any future oil and gas leases. The deed expressly stated,
however, that Luckel was "entitled to one-fourth of any and all royalties
reserved under [any future] leases." 42 Subsequent leases covering the prop-
erty provided for a 1/6th royalty, rather than 1/8th, as provided in the lease
existing at the time of the grant. Mayes' successors in interest claimed that
under these leases, Luckel's successors were entitled to a 1/32nd undivided
royalty interest. Luckel's successors, on the other hand, asserted entitlement
to a 1/24th royalty interest under such leases.
The granting clause in the royalty deed clearly conveyed an undivided
1/32nd royalty interest.43 The future lease clause was, however, capable of
being interpreted as entitling the grantee to a different royalty interest in
future leases than that conveyed in the granting clause.44 In Alford v.
Krum45 the Texas Supreme Court faced a similar conflict between a granting
clause and a "future lease" clause in a mineral deed. In that case the
supreme court held that the granting clause was the controlling provision
defining the estate conveyed. 4" Thus, if the Luckel deed's granting clause
and future lease clause were construed to be irreconcilable, the grant of
38. 787 S.W.2d at 569.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. 792 S.W.2d 485 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1990, writ granted).
42. Id. at 487.
43. Id. at 488.
44. Id.
45. 671 S.W.2d 870 (Tex. 1984).'
46. Id. at 872.
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1/32nd royalty interest in the granting clause would control and Luckel's
successors would be entitled to 1/32nd royalty interest in future leases.
In Luckel the court did not determine whether the two clauses at issue
were in conflict, but instead harmonized the granting clause and the future
lease clause.47 The court cited the judicially noticed fact that the customary
landowner's royalty was 1/8th,48 and that this practice was so common that
Texas courts had taken judicial notice of this fact.49 From this, the court
inferred that the parties to the royalty deed intended for all future leases to
provide for the usual and customary 1/8th landowner's royalty.50 Under
this interpretation, the future lease clause was in harmony with the granting
clause.51 The future lease clause simply confirmed that the grantee had a
1/32nd royalty interest, being 1/4th of the usual and customary 1/8th roy-
alty interest.52 The court held as a matter of law that the royalty deed con-
veyed a 1/32nd royalty interest, and the future lease clause had no effect on
that conveyance. 53
In Clark v. Amoco Production Co.54 the plaintiffs sought to recover from
four oil companies the value of a 1/8th interest in billions of dollars worth of
oil and gas produced from the prolific Spindletop Field in East Texas. Plain-
tiffs Clark and Profitt were the administrators of the estate of James R.
Meadors, who died in 1939. Meadors was the grantee under a 1911 deed
which purported to convey an undivided 1/8th interest in and to four specifi-
cally-described tracts of land.55 The oil company defendants had not pro-
duced any oil or gas from the four described tracts; however, they had
produced vast quantities of oil from other tracts that were once owned by
the McFadden family. The plaintiffs contended that the 1911 deed con-
veyed to Meadors not only a 1/8th interest in the four described tracts, but
also a like interest in all lands in Jefferson County once owned .by the
McFaddens.
The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the oil companies. 56
It held that the 1911 deed unambiguously conveyed an interest only in the
four described parcels of land, and that the undisputed evidence established
47. 792 S.W.2d at 490.
48. Id
49. Id. (citing Garrett v. Dils Co., 157 Tex. 92, 299 S.W.2d 904, 907 (1957); King v. First
Nat'l Bank of Wichita Falls, 144 Tex. 583, 192 S.W.2d 260, 262 (1946); Badger v. King, 331
S.W.2d 955, 958 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1959, writ ref'd n.r.e.)).
50. 792 S.W.2d at 490.
51. Id.
52. Id at 490-91.
53. Id. at 491.
54. 908 F.2d 29 (5th Cir. 1990).
55. In addition, the deed stated that the described property
is all the property that... J.H. McFadden, R.D. McFadden, and A.J. McFad-
den inherited through their ancestor, Win. McFadden, and this deed is intended
to convey to the said James Meadors one-eighth's interest in and to all proper-
ties... that the said J.H. McFadden, A.J. McFadden, and R.D. McFadden are
entitled to by inheritance through their ancestor, the said Win. McFadden, of
every description whatsoever, situated in the said County of Jefferson.
Id at 31 n.3.
56. Id. at 31.
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that the oil companies never owned any interest in, or produced oil or gas
from, those properties.5 7 The plaintiffs appealed, contending that the deed
was ambiguous as to the property conveyed, and that the trial court erred in
failing to consider extrinsic evidence to resolve the ambiguity.
The Fifth Circuit affirmed the summary judgment, holding that the deed
unambiguously reflected an intent to convey an interest in only the four spe-
cifically-described tracts. 58 Since the deed was unambiguous, the trial court
properly excluded extrinsic evidence of the parties' intent.59 Moreover, such
evidence cannot be admitted in order to create an ambiguity where none
exists.60
II. OIL, GAS AND MINERAL LEASES
A. Surface/Mineral Relationship
The broad scope of a lessee's right to utilize the surface for the purpose of
producing oil, gas and other minerals was recently affirmed in Property Own-
ers of Leisure Land, Inc. v. Woolf & Magee, Inc..61 The Tyler court of
appeals held that a unit operator was entitled to construct a road across the
surface of a portion of unitized acreage in derogation of certain residential
subdivision deed restrictions which were created subsequent to the severance
of the mineral estate. 62 In this case, the mineral lessee of a tract of land that
included two subdivision lots pooled its acreage with that of other lessees to
form an oil unit. The unit operator obtained a permit from the Railroad
Commission to drill a well on land located within the unit but outside the
acreage covered by the subdivision. As a condition to granting the well per-
mit, however, the Railroad Commission required the unit operator to estab-
lish an emergency evacuation route since the well was expected to produce
hydrogen sulfide gas. In order to comply with the Railroad Commission's
order, the operator constructed a limestone road with culverts across the
subdivision lots. Subdivision restrictions, however, prohibited the lots from
being used for "a street, access road or public thoroughfare" and further
restricted the use of the lots to single-family residential purposes. These
deed restrictions were imposed on the subdivision lots in 1968, subsequent to
the severance of the mineral estate.
57. Id.
58. According to the court:
The deed initially states that "the property herein conveyed . . . is four (4)
tracts." It then provides a legal description of those four properties and further
explains, more generally, that "the above-described property herein conveyed is
all the property" that the McFaddens inherited from William McFadden. Fi-
nally, and somewhat redundantly, the deed adds that it is intended to convey a
1/8th interest in all the lands inherited by the McFaddens from William Mc-





61. 786 S.W.2d 757 (Tex. App.-Tyler 1990, no writ).
62. Id. at 760.
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Property owners in the subdivision filed suit seeking a declaratory judg-
ment that the emergency road was unrelated to the mineral interest owner's
right of access, that it was not a permissible use of the surface, and that it
was an excessive use violating the subdivision deed restrictions. The trial
court rendered judgment for the unit operator.63 The court of appeals af-
firmed, holding that the mineral owner, having the dominant estate, cannot
be limited by subdivision restrictions imposed by surface owners after the
severance of the mineral estate.6 ' Since the restrictive covenants were im-
posed after the severance of the minerals from the subdivision surface, the
court reasoned that they could not be determinative of the scope of the im-
plied surface easements that are incidental to the ownership of the miner-
als.65 Furthermore, the court held that evidence that the emergency
evacuation road burdened the surface owners and their preferences regard-
ing use of the surface was irrelevant 66 and failed to establish that the unit
operator's use of the surface was not reasonably necessary for the production
and removal of oil, gas and other minerals.67 The court concluded that es-
tablishing the emergency evacuation route was in fact essential to the pro-
duction of hydrocarbons since the Railroad Commission conditioned its
approval of the drilling permit applicable to the well at issue upon the for-
mation of the route.68
. Lessee/Lessor Relationship
1. Lease Provisions
In Riley v. Meriwether69 the El Paso court of appeals held that the mineral
estate created under a Corrected Assignment which did not have a shut-in
royalty clause terminated upon a thirteen-month cessation of production due
to lack of a market for the production." In this case, separate leases cover-
ing nine different tracts were made the subject of a Corrected Assignment.
Neither the Corrected Assignment nor the two assignments which preceded
it contained shut-in royalty clauses, although the underlying leases included
such provisions. The Corrected Assignment provided that it would termi-
nate if a new well was not commenced within ninety days after the cessation
of a specified drilling program or if at least one of the tracts was not produc-
ing gas within sixty days following the completion of the last well in the
program. The jtry found that there had been neither production from nor
operations for production on the tracts covered by the Corrected Assign-
ment during the relevant period, and that during the time the wells were
shut-in it was possible to produce gas in paying quantities.7 1 Based on these
63. Id. at 758.




68. Id at 761.
69. 780 S.W.2d 919 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1989, writ denied).
70. Id at 926.
71. Id. at 921-22.
1991]
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findings the court of appeals affirmed the trial court's judgment terminating
the mineral interest involved. 72 Noting the lessee's admission that the lack
of production was caused because of a lack of market, the court held that
non-availability of a market was not an effective excuse for failure to produce
oil or gas from the tracts in the absence of an appropriate savings
provision.73
The El Paso court addressed several points of error, one of which is of
particular interest. The lessee asserted that the Corrected Assignment had
incorporated by reference the underlying leases, including their shut-in roy-
alty provisions, and that the assignee under the Corrected Assignment had
tendered shut-in royalty in accordance with those provisions in a manner
sufficient to perpetuate the leases and the estate created by the Assignment.
The language of the Corrected Assignment relevant to this issue provided
that "[r]eference for all purposes is made to the oil and gas leases described
in Exhibit A attached hereto and incorporated herein by this reference." 74
In rejecting the notion that this language incorporated the shut-in royalty
provisions of the leases into the Corrected Assignment by reference, the
court stated that to accept this proposition would have required a conclusion
that this language incorporated portions of six separate and different lease
instruments, a matter not clearly expressed by the assignment provision at
issue.75 Instead, the court held that the language quoted above did not in-
corporate the provisions of each lease, but merely incorporated the exhibit as
describing the leases involved. 76 Thus, the court concluded that the shut-in
royalty payments tendered did not have the effect of perpetuating the term of
the Corrected Assignment, which itself had no provisions for shut-in royalty
payments.77
The recent Fifth Circuit decision in Cobb v. Natural Gas Pipeline Co. of
America78 held that cessation of production from a gas well for a period of
nine months resulting from the well's inability to "buck" line pressure con-
stituted a temporary, rather than permanent, cessation of production that, as
a matter of law, did not cause the termination of the underlying oil, gas and
mineral lease.79 In Cobb the lessors sought a declaratory judgment that a
1917 oil, gas and mineral lease had terminated due to periods of non-produc-
tion in 1947, 1962, and 1974. The lessors also sought damages for the
lessee's alleged conversion of gas following the termination of the lease. The
lease involved produced gas in paying quantities at all times since 1928 ex-
cept for a nine-month period in 1946-47, a three-month period in 1962, and
a nine-month period in 1974-75.
72. Id. at 927.
73. Id. at 923 (citing Gulf Oil Corporation v. Reid, 161 Tex. 51, 337 S.W.2d 267, 270
(1960)).
74. 730 S.W.2d at 924.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 924-25.
78. 897 F.2d 1307 (5th Cir. 1990).
79. Id. at 1309-12.
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The trial court rendered judgment that the cessation of production in
1974-75 constituted a permanent cessation which caused the lease to termi-
nate by its own provisionsY° Uncontroverted expert testimony presented by
the lessee established that the cause for each cessation of production was a
decline in wellhead pressure or an increase in pipeline pressure, or some
combination thereof. In each instance, the cessation of production was rem-
edied either by boosting the wellhead pressure through the installation of
compressor units or by decreasing pipeline pressure downstream through the
construction of additional pipeline laterals serving wells that otherwise
would have been forcing gas into the lateral serving the lease at issue. In
addition, testimony indicated that the cessation of production was remedied
within a reasonable period of time.
Reciting well-established Texas law on the subject, the Fifth Circuit
stated that in order to prevent the termination of a lease under the tempo-
rary cessation doctrine, the lessee has the burden of establishing that the
cessation of production results from a sudden stoppage of the well or some
mechanical breakdown of the equipment used on the well and that the lessee
remedied the problem and resumed production within a reasonable time.81
Based on the uncontroverted testimony, the court held that the cessation of
production due to line pressure problems qualified as a sudden stoppage of
the well within the meaning of the temporary cessation doctrine.8 2 The
court further held that, in the absence of any challenge, the expert testimony
presented by the lessee established that it had proceeded with due diligence
to remedy those problems and restore production.8 3
In Cox v. Stowers84 the Amarillo court of appeals held that. a lease had not
terminated even though it had not produced gas in paying quantities for
fifteen months. The court held that the operator's continuous good faith
effort to restore production during the period of non-production by adminis-
tering fluid treatments to the well constituted reworking operations within
the meaning of the lease's "sixty-day clause."85 This case arose under a 1947
oil, gas and mineral lease. The lease was maintained by production from a
single gas well. Except for minimal amounts of production in January, April
and May 1985, no gas was produced from the well from December 1984
until April 1986. The lessor filed suit seeking termination of the lease on the
basis that it had ceased to produce in paying quantities and no drilling or
reworking operations had been conducted on the property during the
months at issue.
The case was tried without a jury. The only witness to testify with regard
to the merits of the case was the lease operator. In summary, he testified
80. Id. at 1308.
81. Id at 1309 (citing Watson v. Rochmill, 137 Tex. 565, 155 S.W.2d 783, 784 (1941)).
82. 397 F.2d at 1311-12.
83. Id
84. 786 S.W.2d 102 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1990, no writ).
85. Id at 106. The relevant clause provided: If after discovery of oil or gas the produc-
tion thereof should cease from any cause, this lease shall not terminate if lessee commences
additional drilling or reworking operations within sixty (60) days thereafter. 'Id.
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that the well had ceased to produce in December 1984 and that the fluid
treatment process administered by him to the well was, based upon his con-
siderable experience, the correct method to use in treating and restoring the
well to productive status and that the waiting periods and procedures fol-
lowed by him were necessary in the course of that treatment. The trial court
rendered judgment for the lessee and the court of appeals affirmed.86
In analyzing whether the lease had terminated, the court of appeals de-
fined "reworking operations" as used in the lease's sixty-day clause to mean
"any and all actual acts, work or operations in which an ordinarily compe-
tent operator, under the same or similar circumstances, would engage in a
good faith effort to cause a well or wells to produce oil or gas in paying
quantities."87 Applying this standard, the court of appeals concluded that
the trial court was justified in finding that the operator's activities which
were commenced within sixty days from the cessation of production and
continued until restoration of substantial production from the well were suf-
ficient to constitute good faith reworking activities.88
Presnal v. TLL Energy Corporation 8 9 addressed the enforceability of a liq-
uidated damages provision in an oil, gas and mineral lease. In 1983, the
Presnals leased a 115-acre tract to TLL's predecessor in interest. The lease
obligated the lessee to drill the maximum number of wells allowable on the
tract, but in no event less than one well. The parties to the lease expressly
recognized that the Texas Railroad Commission field rules applicable to the
lease provided for 160-acre spacing. The lease, however, further provided:
[I]n the event the field rules should change to allow a unit of 80 acres,
then in such event Lessee shall have 45 days ... to commence drilling
another well ... and failure of Lessee to so commence drilling shall
terminate this lease as to such 80 acres ... and Paragraph 42 hereof
shall apply to the Lessee's failure to commence drilling.90
Paragraph forty-two of the lease provided:
Failure of Lessee or Lessee's assigns hereunder to commence drilling
hereunder within the lease period shall entitle Lessor to recover from
Lessee and any assigns hereunder, as liquidated damages, the sum of
$75,000.0091
One of TLL's predecessors in interest drilled a well on the property and
included the lease in a 160-acre unit as prescribed by the Texas Railroad
Commission. Thereafter, the lease was assigned to TLL and the Commis-
sion amended the applicable field rules to permit eighty-acre spacing. TLL
did not drill a second well on the lease.
The Presnals sued TLL claiming that it was bound to drill the second well
or pay $75,000 liquidated damages. TLL obtained a summary judgment in
86. Id.
87. Id. at 105; cf Rogers v. Osborne, 152 Tex. 540, 261 S.W.2d 311, 313-14 (1953); Phil-
lips Petroleum Co. v. Rudd, 226 S.W.2d 464, 466 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1949, no writ).
88. 786 S.W.2d at 106.
89. 788 S.W.2d 123 (Tex. App.-Houston (ist Dist.] 1990, writ denied).
90. Id. at 124.
91. Id.
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the trial court on the grounds that the liquidated damages clause was unen-
forceable as a penalty. The Presnals appealed.
According to Stewart v. Basey,92 the leading Texas case on liquidated
damages, an agreement made in advance of breach fixing the damages there-
for is not enforceable as a contract and does not affect the damages recover-
able for the breach unless (a) the amount so fixed is a reasonable forecast of
just compensation for the harm that is caused by the breach, and (b) the
harm that is caused by the breach is one that is incapable or very difficult of
accurate estimation. 93 The time for determining reasonableness of a liqui-
dated damages provision is at the time of the making of the contract and not
at the time of the breach.94 In order for TLL to be entitled to summary
judgment, it must have established that (a) $75,000 was not a reasonable
forecast of damages at the time the lease was executed, or (b) damages could
have been accurately estimated without difficulty at that time. TLL
presented no evidence in this regard.95 Accordingly, the court of appeals
reversed and remanded the cause, holding that TLL failed to conclusively
prove that the liquidated damages provision was a penalty.96
2. Implied Covenants
In Shelton v. Exxon Corp. 97 the district court awarded the royalty-owner
plaintiff $10.7 million for Exxon's failure to market gas prudently.98 The
King Ranch, as a co-owner of certain minerals along with Shelton, retained
the exclusive executive right over leases, including the exclusive right to en-
force the obligations of the leases. Prior to enactment of the Natural Gas
Policy Act of 1978 (NGPA), 99 Shelton became disenchanted with the
method of royalty payrments from Exxon. Although both Exxon and the
King Ranch knew of Shelton's complaints, the King Ranch and Exxon set-
tled all claims between themselves in 1980 for additional royalties which
accrued before September 1, 1980.
The court upheld the binding effect of the 1980 settlement agreement on
Shelton by holding that the reservation of the executive right was not void or
ineffective, 100 that the power was irrevocable,101 and that no conflict existed
between the King Ranch and Shelton which rendered the King Ranch un-
able to negotiate on behalf of Shelton.102 The court, however, held that the
1980 settlement agreement did not purport to settle Shelton's imprudent
92. 150 Tex. 666, 245 S.W.2d 484 (1952).
93. Id. at 486.
94. 788 S.W.2d at 127 (citing Williams v. Beasley, 300 S.W. 193, 195 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Eastland 1927, writ ref'd)).
95. Id.
96. Id
97. 719 F. Supp. 537 (S.D. Tex. 1989).
98. Id at 538.
99. 15 U.S.C. §§ 3301-3432 (West 1982 & Supp. 1991).
100. 719 F. Supp. at 542.
101. Id.
102. Id at 545.
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marketing claim against Exxon after September 1, 1980.103 Shelton claimed
that Exxon failed to market prudently the King Ranch gas immediately
before enactment of the NGPA by continuing to market the gas to purchas-
ers under long-term warranty contracts. Shelton argued that Exxon should
have dedicated the gas to new contracts at prices that would have allowed
the gas to be classified under NGPA section 105(b)(2) 104 upon enactment of
the NGPA and failure to do so was a breach of Exxon's implied duty to
market prudently.
Brushing aside Exxon's estoppel defenses, 10 5 the court focused on Exxon's
argument that a reasonable, prudent operator would not have entered into
the contracts as proposed by Shelton because it would have been costly to
use high-priced gas purchased on the open market to fill Exxon's warranty
contracts. The court agreed with Shelton's protests that those costs were
unrelated to the King Ranch leases, arose from Exxon's overall, company-
wide marketing plan, and represented risks inherent to long-term warranty
contracts.'16 The court held that the reasonable, prudent operator standard
should not be reduced for Shelton simply because Exxon had warranty con-
tracts legally unrelated to the King Ranch leases.107 Exxon was required to
market the gas in a manner most reasonably profitable for the mineral inter-
est owners and for Exxon's operations. 08
Although the court noted that the possible benefits in 1978 of the hypo-
thetical contracts were uncertain, Exxon could have gained those significant
benefits for the mineral interest owners without itself incurring costs related
to the King Ranch and without subjecting the mineral interest owners to any
risks.' 09 The court held that prudent marketing required Exxon to do so,
and its failure could only be attributed to Exxon's interest in fulfilling its
warranty contracts without having to purchase gas on the open market.110
Exxon's method of marketing the subject gas completely subordinated the
rights of the mineral interest owners to Exxon's financial gain." 1' Those
acts, the court concluded, were not those of a reasonable, prudent operator
having its own and the plaintiff's interests in mind."12
The court awarded Shelton $10.7 million in damages for underpayment of
royalty, calculated as the difference between the royalties paid him and those
that would have been paid under market value contracts. 113 The court fur-
ther awarded pre-judgment interest and attorneys' fees of one-third of the
amount of total recovery of principal and pre-judgment interest." 4
103. Id. at 547-48.
104. 15 U.S.C. § 3315.
105. 791 F. Supp. at 546.
106. Id at 548.






113. Id. at 550.
114. Id. at 550-51.
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III. GAS PURCHASE CoNTRAcTS
In Houston Pipe Line Co. v. BHP Petroleum (Americas), Ina "5 the Hous-
ton court of appeals applied the provisions of FERC Order Number 399116
in holding that BHP was not required to refund to Houston Pipe a portion of
the proceeds received from the sale of gas. 1 7 The dispute focused upon the
sale of gas under a 1976 contract during the period from January 1, 1981,
through June 30, 1983. During that time, Houston Pipe paid BHP for the
gas based upon a certain price per million Btu's (MMBtu's)1" 8 and calcu-
lated the heating content of the gas on the basis of "dry" conditions at which
the gas was delivered. The price paid by Houston Pipe was determined pur-
suant to annual redetermination agreements which fixed the contract price
for each year involved at the NGPA ceiling price in effect for the month of
January of each such year. Thus, the price per MMbtu under the redetermi-
nation agreements was fixed at $2.667 for 1981, $3.003 for 1982, and $3.299
for 1983. In contrast, the NGPA ceiling prices in effect for the gas escalated
each month.
At times relevant to the lawsuit, the NGPA provided for maximum lawful
prices per MMbtu for various categories of natural gas. The Federal Energy
Regulatory Commission (FERC) promulgated rules for measuring the Btu
content of gas, which at one time required that such content be measured
under "dry" conditions, but which in 1983 were amended to require that the
Btu content of gas be measured by reference to water-vapor saturated "wet"
conditions. 11 9 Use of the wet rule resulted in a slightly lower Btu content
than that obtained by use of the dry rule. The lower Btu content, in turn,
lowered the maximum amount of revenues that could be collected under the
NGPA for a particular volume of gas.120 In addition, the FERC required
that the wet rule be applied retroactively.121 As a result, some producers
found that they had overcharged gas purchasers. 122 Pursuant to FERC Or-
der No. 399, gas producers were required to refund those overcharges.123 In
this case, upon the adoption of the wet rule and the issuance of the refund
115. 785 S.W.2d 398 (rex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1988, no writ).
116. 49 Fed. Reg. 37,735 (1984). The relevant provisions of Order 399 provide that:
[A]ny first seller that collected revenues in excess of the product of (a) the appli-
cable maximum lawful price established by the NGPA, and (b) the quantity of
MMbtu's (million Btu's) determined on the basis of the wet rule (i.e., under
standard test conditions) must refund any such excess revenues. To the extent
that revenues collected for gas sold in a first sale under the NGPA are less than
or equal to the level of revenues thus calculated, and are contractually author-
ized, no excess revenues would have been collected, and no refunds are due.
Id. at 37,737.
117. 785 S.W.2d at 398.
118. "A 'Btu' (British thermal unit) is the standard of measurement of the energy content
of natural gas." 785 S.W.2d at 398.
119. See Interstate Natural Gas Ass'n of America v. Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n,
716 F.2d I (D.C. Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1108 (1984) (explaining history of FERC's
Btu measurement rules).
120. 785 S.W.2d at 399.
121. FERC Order 399, 49 Fed. Reg. 37,735, 37,737 (1984).
122. 785 S.W.2d at 399.
123. 49 Fed. Reg. 37,735, 37,737 (1984).
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order, Houston Pipe determined that it had been overcharged during the
thirty-month period at issue and invoiced BHP for a refund. BIP refunded
$97,884.71, but later decided that it should have refunded only $15,901.43.
When Houston Pipe disagreed and refused to return the difference, BHP
filed suit.
In this instance, the court determined that although the maximum lawful
price under the NGPA for the gas at issue escalated on a monthly basis, the
contract price at issue escalated only once each year at the time of the annual
price redetermination. 24 As a result, the contract price exceeded the maxi-
mum lawful price only during the first few months of each year, and there-
fore, refunds were due only with regard to those months. 25 Houston Pipe,
however, contended that the FERC orders requiring calculation of Btu's on
a wet basis effectively reduced the NGPA ceiling price, and by operation of
the contract and price redeterminations, likewise reduced the redetermined
contract prices, thereby reducing the revenues that BHP was contractually
entitled to receive. The court rejected this argument, reasoning that the
NGPA ceiling prices were not amended by the FERC orders.126 Instead,
the court held that those orders changed only the method for measuring
Btu's for NGPA purposes, and this change, although reducing the total
amount of revenues that could legally be collected, did not reduce the maxi-
mum lawful price chargeable for gas. 127
In Dorchester Master Limited Partnership v. Bullock 128 gas producers
sued to recover gas production taxes paid under protest. Dorchester pro-
duced gas from wells and sold the gas to an interstate pipeline company
pursuant to a 1952 gas contract. Prior to delivery to the pipeline,
Dorchester processed the gas, removing certain substances at its plant as
authorized by the gas contract. The contract provided for a price of $0.30
per Mcf, and a minimum heating value of 1,000 Btu per cubic foot.
In 1977, Dorchester and the pipeline amended the contract so as to permit
Dorchester to extract additional substances from the gas, which would have
the effect of reducing the heating content of the residue gas to less than 1,000
Btu per cubic foot. As compensation for this reduction, the parties agreed
that Dorchester would furnish additional gas from other sources in an
amount necessary to raise the average heating content of all gas delivered to
1,000 Btu per cubic foot.
The Texas State Comptroller audited Dorchester following the amend-
ment and determined that Dorchester owed taxes and penalties relating to
production under the contract. According to the Comptroller, gas produc-
tion taxes should have been paid on the basis of $0.27 per Mcf. This figure
was derived by reducing the original contract price of $0.30 per Mcf in pro-
portion to the reduction in Btu content (900/1,000). Dorchester contested
124. 785 S.W.2d at 400.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 401.
127. Id.
128. 794 S.W.2d 554 (rex. App.-Austin 1990, writ denied).
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this reasoning and claimed that the taxes were due on the market price of the
gas as calculated by subtracting from the contract price the production and
marketing costs, including the costs of purchasing the make-up gas. The
trial court granted summary judgment that Dorchester take nothing.1 29
Under the Texas Tax Code" 0° each producer is obligated to pay a gas
production tax at the rate of 7.5 percent of the market value of gas produced
and saved in Texas by the producer.1 31 According to the Code, the market
value is the value of the gas at the mouth of the well. 132 In the absence of
bad faith, fraud or collusion, the value of the gas is presumed to be the nego-
tiated contract price between the gas producer and the purchaser.1 33 The
court noted that the tax base may, however, be altered by other factors.' 34
"If gas is not sold at the well-head, the costs of transportation and process-
ing, incurred downstream from the wellhead, are deducted in determining
the sale price."' 135 Additionally, marketing costs, including costs for com-
pressing, treating, and transporting the gas, are deductible from the pro-
ducer's gross receipts.' 36
Because there was no claim that the contract was other than an arm's-
length agreement, the tax base was held to be the $0.30 per Mcf contract
price.137 From this amount, Dorchester was entitled to deduct the cost of
the make-up gas.138 The court noted that if Dorchester did not add the
make-up gas to the residue gas, the gas would not meet the minimum heat-
ing quality requirements under the contract.1 39 The court reasoned that, by
adding the make-up gas, Dorchester was treating the rest of the gas by in-
creasing the total Btu content. 40 Accordingly, the cost of such make-up gas
was held to be a marketing cost. 41 The court of appeals therefore reversed
the judgment of the district court, and remanded the cause with instructions
to render judgment for Dorchester in accordance with the parties' previous
stipulations of the amount to be refunded to Dorchester if its calculations
were held to be correct. 142
IV. POOLING
In Pend Oreille Oil & Gas Co. v. Railroad Commission 143 the Corpus
Christi court of appeals held that the Railroad Commission's pooling au-
129. Id. at 555.
130. TEx. TAX CODE ANN. § 201.052(a) (Vernon 1982).
131. Id.
132. Id. § 201.101.
133. Calvert v. Union Producing Co., 402 S.W.2d 221 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1966, writ
ref'd n.r.e.).
134. 794 S.W.2d at 556.
135. Id. (citing Mobil Oil Co. v. Calvert, 451 S.W.2d 889, 892 (Tex. 1970)).
136. 34 TEx. ADMIN. CODE § 5.15 (West 1988).
137. 794 S.W.2d at 556-57.





143. 788 S.W.2d 878 (Tex. App.--Corpus Christi 1990, writ granted).
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thority under the Mineral Interest Pooling Act (MIPA) 14 does not author-
ize the pooling of separate reservoirs which are not in natural
communication with each other even though the Commission may have pre-
viously granted a Rule 10145 exception permitting downhole commingling of
the hydrocarbons contained in those reservoirs. 14 Pend Oreille owned a
working interest in a producing gas well situated in the Limes Field in Live
Oak County, Texas. Bill Forney was the lessee of the land immediately adja-
cent to Pend Oreille's lease. The Limes Field consisted of two separate res-
ervoirs: the main sand and a stray sand. The two sands were not in natural
communication and constituted two separate reservoirs. The stray sand lay
directly above the main sand and covered only a portion of the field. It was
much thinner than the main sand, and the two were separated by six to ten
feet of impermeable rock.
Pend Oreille operated a well on its lease which, pursuant to a Rule 10
exception granted by the Commission, commingled gas from both sands.
Forney filed an application with the Railroad Commission to force pool his
lease with Pend Oreille's. The Commission granted the application and, in
the process, force pooled both the main sand and the stray sand. Pend
Oreille sought review of the Commission's order by filing suit in Live Oak
County. The trial court affirmed the Commission's order, but the court of
appeals reversed, holding that the Commission had no statutory authority to
enter the order.' 47
In holding that the Commission had exceeded its statutory authority, the
court of appeals noted that the Commission was without statutory authority
under the MIPA to pool more than "a common reservoir."'148 The appellees
claimed, however, that because the Commission had granted a Rule 10 ex-
ception allowing both reservoirs involved to be produced as one, the reser-
voirs effectively became "a common reservoir" within the meaning of the
MIPA. The court rejected this contention, reasoning that a Rule 10 excep-
tion provides only that commingled production of gas permitted under such
an exception may be considered production from a common source of supply
for the purposes of proration and allocation and not for the purpose of exer-
cising the Commission's pooling authority under the MIPA. 49 In reaching
this conclusion, the court analyzed the legislative history of Rule 10 and the
evolution of the Commission's authority to grant exceptions from the "no
commingling" provisions of that Rule.150
As matters stood in 1977, Rule 10 totally prohibited downhole commin-
gling. Following decisions' 5 1 of the Texas Supreme Court in 1977 and 1979
144. TEX. NAT. Ras. CODE ANN. § 102.001-.112 (Vernon 1978).
145. Tex. R.R. Comm'n, 16 TEx. ADMIN. CODE § 3.10 (West 1988).
146. 788 S.W.2d at 883.
147. Id. at 880.
148. Id. at 880-81 (citing TEX. NAT. REs. CODE ANN. § 102.011 (Vernon 1978)).
149. Id. at 883.
150. Id.
151. See Railroad Comm'n of Texas v. Grayford Oil Corp., 557 S.W.2d 946 (Tex. 1977);
Gage v. Railroad Comm'n of Texas, 582 S.W.2d 410 (rex. 1979).
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confirming the Commission's lack of authority to combine several reservoirs
into a single field for administrative purposes, the Texas legislature amended
the Natural Resources Code to grant the Commission authority to issue ex-
ceptions to Rule 10, thus allowing downhole commingling. 152 After the pas-
sage of this legislation, the Commission amended Rule 10 to permit
exceptions from the Rule, but in the process further amended Rule 10 to
provide that commingled production could be considered production from a
common source of supply for purposes of proration and allocation.' 5 3 Sub-
sequently, the court of appeals held that the latter amendment of Rule 10 by
the Commission was invalid. The court reasoned that although the legisla-
ture had given the Commission the authority to grant exceptions to Rule 10,
it had not granted the Commission the authority to amend the Rule to allow
commingled production to be considered production from a common source
of supply for proration purposes. 15 4 In response to this judicial decision, the
legislature granted the Commission the authority to prorate the production
from commingled reservoirs as if they were from a common source of
supply. 155
The court of appeals in Pend Oreille concluded that this legislative history
demonstrated a refusal by the legislature to grant the Commission broad
general powers to regulate commingled oil and gas.156 In the absence of any
legislative history indicating an intent to expand the Commission's authority
to pool under the MIPA, the court held that it was not reasonable to con-
clude that the legislature intended to give the Commission broader power
than that which is expressly stated in the MIPA. 57 Because the MIPA is
the sole source of the Commission's pooling authority and is clearly limited
to tracts underlaid by "a common reservoir," the court was constrained to
hold that the granting of a Rule 10 commingling exception did not alter the
Commission's authority to pool. 158 Therefore, by the plain limitations of the
MIPA, the Commission had no authority to enter an order pooling both the
stray sand and the main sand as a common reservoir.' 5 9
In Edwin M. Jones Oil Co. v. Pend Oreille Oil & Gas Co. 160 a mineral
owner sought a declaratory judgment that it owned a working interest share
in a certain gas unit and sought recovery for its claimed share of production
from such unit.
Edwin M. Jones Oil Company (Jones) owned the minerals in a certain
eighty-acre tract of land at the time it entered into a farmout agreement with
Pend Oreille. Under the provisions of the agreement, Pend Oreille agreed to
drill a test well on or offsetting the Jones tract. If the well was commercially
152. TEx. NAT. REs. CODE ANN. §§ 85.046, 86.012 (Vernon 1978 & Supp. 1991).
153. Id.
154. See Railroad Comm'n of Texas v. Mote Resources, 645 S.W.2d 639 (rex. App.-
Austin 1983, no writ).
155. TEx. NAT. REs. CODE ANN. §§ 85.053, -.055(d), 86.081 (Vernon 1978 & Supp. 1991).
156. 788 S.W.2d at 882.
157. Id at 883.
158. /d
159. Id
160. 794 S.W.2d 442 (rex. App.-Corpus Christi 1990, no writ).
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productive, Jones agreed to lease the tract to Pend Oreille, reserving a 1/8th
royalty and a 1/8th overriding royalty interest, and Pend Oreille agreed to
form a gas unit which would include all of the Jones tract in accordance with
the lease's pooling provisions. The farmout agreement further provided that
Jones had the option to convert the 1/8th overriding royalty interest into a
1/3rd working interest in the well and the acreage allocated to the well.
Thereafter, Jones could participate in the production allocated to the 1/3rd
working interest attributable to the Jones tract on a surface-acreage basis.
Pend Oreille earned a lease on the Jones tract by drilling and completing a
producing gas well, known as the Peet Well. In accordance with the
farmout agreement, Jones leased the land to Pend Oreille who formed the
320-acre Peet Gas Unit, which included the entire Jones tract. Following
payout, Jones converted its overriding royalty interest into a 1/3rd working
interest in the well and the farmout acreage allocated to the well. The Peet
Well then ceased production.
Pend Oreille drilled the Geffert No. 1 Well as a replacement well. This
well was not located on the Jones tract, but it was within the Peet Gas Unit
boundaries. Thereafter, Pend Oreille formed the 352-acre Geffert Gas Unit,
which included the Jones tract, and dissolved the Peet Gas Unit. The Gef-
fert No. 1 Well then ceased production and Pend Oreille drilled the Geffert
No. 2 Well, which was situated within the Geffert Gas Unit, but on a tract
which had not been included in the Peet Gas Unit.
Based on these facts, Jones contended that it had a working interest in
both Geffert wells while Pend Oreille, on the other hand, claimed that Jones
did not own a working interest in either well. The jury found that Jones had
a working interest in the Geffert No. 1 Well, but that it had no working
interest in the Geffert No. 2 Well.' 6' Both parties appealed.
As to the Geffert No. 1 Well, the appellate court held that the evidence
supported the jury finding that Jones owned a working interest in the
well.' 62 According to the court, under the farmout agreement, Jones was
entitled to participate in unit production to the extent of 1/3rd of the pro-
duction attributable to the lease on a surface-acreage basis. 163 The Geffert
No. 1 Well was drilled on a tract within the Peet Gas Unit prior to the
dissolution of the Peet Gas Unit, but after the time that Jones converted its
overriding royalty interest into a working interest. Accordingly, Jones was
entitled to a working interest in such well. 64
As to the Geffert No. 2 Well, the appellate court held that Jones had no
right to a working interest share. 16 5 The court noted that the well was not
drilled on acreage which had been pooled with the farmout acreage and
Jones had not executed the document designating the Geffert Gas Unit. 66
161. Id. at 445.
162. Id. at 449.
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. Id. at 448.
166. Id. at 447.
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Thus, Jones had no pooled interest in the well.1 67 Moreover, the court
found significant the fact that the well had been drilled after Jones converted
its overriding royalty interest into a working interest. 168 Because the
farmout agreement and the lease only authorized Pend Oreille to pool Jones'
royalty interest, the court ruled that Jones' working interest was never
pooled.' 69 The court further held that the lack of express pooling authority
with respect to the interest at issue also precluded any conclusion that Jones
owned a pooled interest in the well.'170 Therefore, the court concluded that
Jones had no working interest in the No. 2 Well.' 7'
The plaintiff in Fletcher v. Ricks Exploration 7 2 owned an oil, gas and
mineral lease covering an undivided one-quarter interest in a certain 100-
acre tract. Ricks Exploration Company and S. J. & R. Corporation owned
an oil, gas and mineral lease covering an undivided one-half mineral interest
in a thirty-acre tract which comprised part of the 100-acre tract. Ricks Ex-
ploration was also the operator of a producing gas unit encompassing the
thirty-acre tract.
Ricks Exploration and others executed a unit designation pooling the
thirty-acre tract with other acreage. Fletcher then executed and filed a ratifi-
cation of the unit, seeking to share in the production from the unit gas well,
despite the fact that the Texas Railroad Commission had determined that
the thirty-acre tract was not productive as to gas and other products pro-
duced from the unit well. Ricks Exploration and S. J. & R. refused to ac-
count to Fletcher for any of the production from the well allocated to the
thirty-acre tract. Thereafter, Fletcher filed suit claiming that he was entitled
to share in unit revenues because his ratification of the unit designation had
the effect of making him a unit participant just as if he had executed the unit
designation instrument.
The trial court denied Fletcher's claim and the Fifth Circuit affirmed.' 73
In reaching its decision, the Fifth Circuit reasoned that the unit designation
did not constitute an offer to other interest owners within the unit to ratify
the designation and participate in the unit because the instrument did not
contain reasonably definite terms sufficient to qualify as an offer to pool.' 74
Because the mere preparation and filing of a unit designation does not con-
stitute an offer to all persons who hold leases on lands within the designated
acreage to join in the unit, the court held that Fletcher could not accept an
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A. Gas Rights versus Oil Rights
In the ongoing white oil controversy, the Texas Supreme Court in
Amarillo Oil Co. v. Energy-A gri Products, Inc. 17 6 defined the meaning of
"casinghead gas" as gas produced from an oil stratum and then analyzed
whether the gas at issue fit that definitign. 17
Amarillo Oil owned the gas rights under a certain lease in Carson County,
Texas. Energy-Agri owned the oil and casinghead gas rights under the same
lease. In 1952, Amarillo Oil's predecessors in interest drilled and completed
a producing gas well on the tract in the Brown Dolomite Formation which
continued to produce gas. In 1982, Energy-Agri drilled and completed an
oil well on the tract in the Granite Wash Formation. This well produced
very small amounts of black crude oil and casinghead gas and almost no
natural gas. Energy-Agri later perforated the casing in its oil well opposite
the Brown Dolomite Formation and began producing approximately
375,000 cubic feet of gas per day from the formation. Amarillo Oil brought
suit against Energy-Agri seeking to enjoin Energy-Agri from producing gas
from the Brown Dolomite Formation, to quiet title to all of the gas in the
formation, and to recover damages for the conversion of gas produced by
Energy-Agri from the formation. The trial court rendered a take-nothing
judgment for Amarillo Oil based on the jury verdict, which involved classifi-
cation of the relevant wells.178 Issues relating to title to the gas were not
presented to the jury. On appeal by Amarillo Oil, the appellate court dis-
missed the case, holding that the action constituted an impermissible collat-
eral attack on matters within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Texas Railroad
Commission.' 79
The supreme court reversed, holding that the dispute between the parties
involved the determination of ownership of the "casinghead gas."' 80 En-
ergy-Agri contended that the term "casinghead gas" means any gas pro-
duced from a well that has been classified by the Railroad Commission as an
oil well and claimed that it was entitled to all gas produced by its oil wells.
Amarillo Oil asserted that the statutory definition of "casinghead gas" con-
trolled and that the determination of title to gas based upon the classification
of a well by the Railroad Commission was inconsistent with such a
definition.
The Texas Natural Resources Code defines "casinghead gas" as "any gas
or vapor indigenous to an oil stratum and produced from the stratum with
oil." s181 In order to apply this definition to the instant case, the supreme
court examined the meaning of the term "oil stratum."' 8 2 Although the
176. 794 S.W.2d 20 (rex. 1990).
177. Id. at 22-25.
178. Id. at 21.
179. 731 S.W.2d 113 (rex. App.-Amarillo 1987), rev'd, 794 S.W.2d 20 (rex. 1990).
180. 794 S.W.2d at 22.
181. TEx. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. § 86.002(10) (Vernon 1978).
182. 794 S.W.2d at 22-23.
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Texas Natural Resources Code does not define the term "oil stratum," it
does define an "oil well" as "any well that produces one barrel or more of oil
to each 100,000 cubic feet of gas." 183 The court thus reasoned that an "oil
stratum" was a stratum that produces 100,000 cubic feet of gas or less per
barrel of oil.'14 Additionally, the court noted that the statutory definition of
"casinghead gas" requires that such gas must be produced as a necessary
incident to the production of oil.185
To determine whether Energy-Agri was producing gas or "casinghead
gas" from its oil wells, the court examined each of Energy-Agri's comple-
tions in the Brown Dolomite Formation and determined whether the pro-
duction from that stratum at that particular location yielded a producing
gas/oil ratio of 100,000 cubic feet of gas or less per barrel of oil.186 The
supreme court rendered judgment quieting Amarillo Oil's title to gas, other
than casinghead gas, as defined in the opinion, produced from the Brown
Dolomite Formation through Energy-Agri's oil wells. 18 7
The supreme court rejected Energy-Agri's claims that the court had no
jurisdiction over the case because it involved the classification of oil and gas
wells, a matter within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Texas Railroad Com-
mission. 188 In this respect, the court held that the dispute between the par-
ties was over the ownership of the gas being produced from the Brown
Dolomite Formation,'8 9 and therefore, the cause was properly within the
jurisdiction of the courts since the Texas Railroad Commission has no au-
thority to determine title to land or property rights.190 The court did respect
the Railroad Commission's express approval of Energy-Agri's production of
gas from the Brown Dolomite Formation,' 91 however, noting that such au-
thorization does not mean that Energy-Agri owned the gas. 192 Because of
the Commission approval, the supreme court held the injunctive relief im-
proper as a remedy for Amarillo Oil's legal damage. 193 The supreme court
was unable to assess damages due to the state of the record and remanded
the cause to the trial court for determination of damages. 194
B. Joint Operations
In Vortt Exploration Co. v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. ' 95 the Texas Supreme
Court held that the elements of quantum meruit were met in connection
with a claim for the value of seismic information provided in the course of
183. TEx. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. § 86.002(6) (Vernon 1978).
184. 794 S.W.2d at 22.
185. Id at 25.
186. Id
187. Id
188. Id. at 25-26.
189. Id
190. Id at 26.
191. Id. at 27.
192. Id
193. Id
194. Id at 28.
195. 787 S.W.2d 942 (Tex. 1990).
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unsuccessful negotiations for a joint operating agreement. 96 Chevron and
Vortt owned mineral interests in different portions of a tract of land. In
1978, Vortt contacted Chevron seeking a farmout agreement regarding
Chevron's portion of the tract. Chevron rejected this request so Vortt pro-
posed that the two companies enter into a joint operating agreement. Chev-
ron informed Vortt that it might be interested in such an arrangement and
requested that Vortt submit a proposal. Chevron and Vortt negotiated for
several years regarding the specifics of such an arrangement without ever
reaching an agreement. During the negotiations, Vortt provided Chevron
with confidential seismic services, graphics, and maps in an attempt to reach
a joint operating agreement. After negotiations were broken off, Chevron
drilled a producing well at the location identified in the information pro-
vided by Vortt.
Chevron brought suit to invalidate certain leases held by Vortt. Vortt
counterclaimed, asserting the validity of its leases, or alternatively, claiming
entitlement to recovery under quantum meruit for the seismic services pro-
vided to Chevron. The trial court rendered judgment in favor of Vortt on its
quantum meruit claim. 197 The court of appeals reversed, however, and ren-
dered in favor of Chevron on the basis that Vortt failed to establish one of
the elements for recovery under quantum meruit.198 Specifically, the court
of appeals held that there was not a factual finding that Vortt furnished the
seismic information under such circumstances as to "reasonably notify
Chevron that Vortt expected payment' 99 for the services and assistance
which were provided. ' '2°°
The supreme court disagreed.20' To recover under quantum meruit, a
plaintiff must prove the following elements: 1) valuable services were ren-
dered or materials were furnished; 2) for the person sought to be charged; 3)
which services and materials were accepted by the person sought to be
charged, and used or enjoyed by him; and 4) under such circumstances as
reasonably notified the person sought to be charged that the plaintiff, in per-
forming such services or furnishing such material, was expecting to be paid
by the person sought to be charged. 202 The relevant findings of fact by the
trial court included the following:
(9) Vortt provided the [seismic] services and assistance to Chevron in
the belief that Chevron and Vortt would jointly develop the subject
160 acres for the production of oil and gas, but for such belief
would not have provided such services and assistance to Chevron,
which were undertaken for both Chevron and Vortt.203
196. Id. at 945.
197. Id. at 944.
198. 787 S.W.2d 414, 417 (rex. App.-Fort Worth 1988), rev'd, 787 S.W.2d 942 (rex.
1990).
199. 787 S.W.2d at 417.
200. Id. at 416-17.
201. 787 S.W.2d at 945.
202. Id. at 944 (citing Bashara v. Baptist Memorial Hosp. Sys., 685 S.W.2d 307, 310 (rex.
1985)).
203. 787 S.W.2d at 416.
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13. Chevron was reasonably notified that Vortt in performing such
services and assistance for Chevron expected to join with Chevron
in a mutually satisfactory agreement for their joint production of oil
and gas from the subject 160 acres.204
The court of appeals stated that such notification did not rise to the level
of that required by the fourth element of a quantum meruit claim because
such services were not rendered under circumstances that would reasonably
notify Chevron that Vortt expected to be paid for the seismic information. 20 5
The supreme court, however, held that the expected payment did not have to
be monetary, but could be any form of compensation.20 6 Since Chevron
knew that Vortt furnished the information with the expectation that a joint
operating agreement would be reached, the supreme court held that the trial
court's finding of fact reflected that Chevron was reasonably notified that
Vortt expected to be paid for the services and assistance that were ren-
dered.207 Accordingly, the supreme court reversed the judgment of the
court of appeals and remanded the cause to that court to consider several
other points of error on which the court of appeals did not originally rule.208
In C & C Partners v. Sun Exploration & Production Co. 209 the Dallas
court of appeals held that the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act210
(DTPA) did not apply to oil and gas operations conducted under explora-
tion and joint operating agreements because the claimant nonoperator was
not a consumer within the meaning of the statute. 211 Sun filed a lawsuit
against C & C and others, asserting claims for breach of exploration and
joint operating agreements and for fraudulent misrepresentation in connec-
tion with operations thereunder. C & C counterclaimed against Sun, alleg-
ing certain violations of the DTPA. Following trial, the district court
granted an instructed verdict for Sun on C & C's DTPA counterclaim on the
ground that C & C and the other defendants were not "consumers" as de-
fined by the DTPA.212 In accordance with the jury's findings, the trial court
rendered judgment in favor of Sun for breach of contract and fraudulent
misrepresentation and awarded actual and punitive damages, prejudgment
204. Id
205. 787 S.W.2d 414, 417 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1988), rev'd, 787 S.W.2d 942 (Tex.
1990).
206. 787 S.W.2d 942, 945 (rex. 1990).
207. Id.
208. Id
209. 783 S.W.2d 707 (rex. App.-Dallas 1989, writ denied).
210. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. §§ 17.41-.63 (Vernon 1987).
211. 783 S.W.2d 712-13.
212. Id. As the appellate court noted:
One who maintains a private lawsuit under § 17.50 of the DTPA (providing a
private right of action for consumers) must be a consumer as defined in
§ 17.45(4). Riverside Nat'l Bank v. Lewis, 603 S.W.2d 169, 173 (Tex. 1980);
.... Under the DTPA, a consumer is defined, in pertinent part, as "an individ-
ual, partnership, [or] corporation.. .who seeks or acquires by purchase or lease,
any goods or services. TEx. Bus. & CoM. CODE ANN. § 17.45(4) (Vernon
1987)."
783 S.W.2d at 711-12.
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interest, and attorneys' fees. 213
C & C appealed on a number of grounds, one of which related to the trial
court's granting of an instructed verdict on the DTPA counterclaim. C & C
asserted that certain fact issues existed surrounding its status as a consumer
-and that Sun failed to establish as a matter of law that C & C and the other
defendants were not consumers. C & C contended that it purchased services
and materials from Sun, and therefore, it was a consumer.
To establish its status as a consumer under the DTPA, a plaintiff must
first show that it sought or acquired goods or services by purchase or lease;
and second, that the goods or services purchased or leased form the basis of
the complaint under the DTPA.214 In the case at hand, Sun was the opera-
tor and C & C and the other defendants were the nonoperators with respect
to three properties covered by separate joint operating agreements. The
agreements provided that the joint account would be charged for items such
as the labor costs of Sun's field employees, the materials purchased or fur-
nished for use on the prospect properties, and the costs of services provided
by contract personnel on the prospect properties. The parties' joint account
was charged for these labor costs, materials, and services. Additionally, C &
C was billed for its share of administrative costs incurred by Sun on behalf of
all of the parties. Sun sought reimbursement only for costs incurred on be-
half of the operating and nonoperating interest owners and did not make a
profit when it charged for these costs. Following the factually similar case of
Hamilton v. Texas Oil & Gas Corp.,215 the appellate court held that C & C
was not a consumer under the DTPA as a matter of law.216
The other issue relevant to oil, gas and mineral law discussed on appeal
concerned the effect of the absence of written authorizations for expenditures
(AFE). C & C claimed that the nonoperating interest owners did not con-
sent to the operations for which Sun sought recovery of the nonoperators'
share of costs. C & C argued that under the requirements of the operating
agreements, the nonoperators' consent had to be evidenced in writing by
means of AFEs and no written consent in the form of AFEs had been signed
by C & C. The appellate court rejected this claim, however, noting that the
joint operating agreements did not require consent to be in any particular
form.217
On the basis of other points of error not discussed here, the appellate
213. Id. at 711.
214. Id. at 712 (citing Melody Home Mfg. Co. v. Barnes, 741 S.W.2d 349, 351-52 (Tex.
1987)).
215. 648 S.W.2d 316 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1982, no writ).
216. 783 S.W.2d at 713.
217. The court stated:
The contracts clearly require consent, but they do not specify that any particular
form of consent is required. Consent by telephone is permitted but not required
under certain circumstances. Any telephoned notice or response (consent or
nonconsent) is required to be confirmed in writing. Thus, the only requirement
of a writing is in the case of confirmation of consent or nonconsent or confirma-
tion of notice of a proposed operation. Confirmation of consent is obviously
distinct and separate from consent itself, as to which there is no requirement of a
writing. Moreover, the contract plainly does not state that consent is invalid or
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court reversed the trial court's award of actual and punitive damages in con-
nection with Sun's fraudulent misrepresentation claim and rendered a take-
nothing judgment for Sun.218 Additionally, the court of appeals reversed the
trial court's award of prejudgment interest and remanded the case for fur-
ther proceedings on this issue.219 The appellate court affirmed the judgment
of the trial below in all other respects.220
C. Other Issues
In Winslow v. Acker 22' the San Antonio court of appeals held that the
executive right holder did not breach her obligations to the nonexecutive
interest owners by obtaining an overriding royalty for herself under an oil
and gas lease covering the property at issue because the executive had
strictly complied with the express terms of the grant of the executive right by
reserving a proportionate share of a 1/8th royalty for the nonexecutives.222
This case arose out of a partition deed which severed the executive right
from a portion of the mineral estate. Following the death of J.E. Murphy,
his five children partitioned the land that they inherited from their father by
executing individual partition deeds. The deed at issue in the lawsuit con-
veyed certain property to Johnie Lorene Acker from her brother and sisters
and contained a reservation relating to the executive right.223 Subsequently,
Johnie Lorene Acker executed four separate oil and gas leases to the same
lessee, each lease relating to a portion of the lands covered by the partition
ineffective if it is not confirmed in writing. The provisions on consent also con-
tain absolutely nothing about AEs.
Id. at 714-15 (emphasis in original).
218. Id at 718-20, 724.
219. Id. at 720-21, 724.
220. Id. at 784.
221. 781 S.W.2d 322 (rex. App.-San Antonio 1989, writ denied).
222. Id. at 328.
223. The deed provided, in part:
Provided, however, it is expressly understood and agreed by each and all of the
parties hereto that no part of the oil, gas, or other minerals in, on, or under the
above-described lands are hereby conveyed or are intended or affected by this
instrument except as hereinafter provided, and the parties hereto, their respec-
tive heirs and assigns, shall continue to own and hold in common all of the oil,
gas and other minerals, in, on, and under all of the above-described lands in the
same undivided proportion that said parties now own and hold said oil, gas and
other minerals .... and none of the royalties, reversionary interests, or other
rights of said parties under existing oil, gas and mineral leases shall be affected
in any manner by this instrument; it being further provided, however, anything
in the foregoing to the contrary notwithstanding, that the grantee of the surface
estate herein, Johnnie Lorene Acker, shall have the exclusive right to execute,.
without the joinder of any of the grantors herein, any oil, gas or mineral lease
that she desires on any such terms arshe may desire, and receive, as her separate
property, such bonuses, oil payments, and rentals as may be paid under said oil,
gas and mineral leases so executed by her, except that she shall reserve in each
oil, gas, and mineral lease so executed by her a base one-eighth (1/8) royalty
interest for the benefit of herself and the other four children of I.E. Murphy,
deceased, grantors herein, in the same proportion they now own same.
Id. at 324.
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deed to Acker. The lessee under the leases assigned a 5-1/2% overriding
royalty interest to Johnie Lorene Acker and her husband.
The nonexecutive owners of the pertinent tracts brought suit against
Acker and her husband, claiming entitlement to a portion of the overriding
royalty interest. The nonexecutives also sought damages for breach of fidu-
ciary duty and conspiracy by Acker in obtaining the overriding royalties.
The Ackers counterclaimed seeking a declaration of their right to retain the
overriding royalties. The trial court granted the Acker's motion for sum-
mary judgment and declared that the nonexecutives had no right, title or
interest in the overriding royalty interest.224 The judgment also decreed that
the nonexecutives had reserved unto themselves, their heirs and assigns, an
undivided 4/Sths of 1/8th royalty and granted to Johnie Lorene Acker the
executive rights and the right to receive all other benefits derived from leas-
ing the mineral estate, including overriding royalties and royalties over and
above 4/5ths of 1/8th.225
On appeal, the nonexecutives claimed that the granting of the motion for
summary judgment was improper. The nonexecutives asserted that a ques-
tion of fact existed regarding the ambiguous term "base one-eighth royalty"
contained in the partition deed. They claimed that the deed was unclear as
to whether they were entitled to a set fraction of production or a fraction of
subsequent royalties to be determined by the terms of future leases. The
nonexecutives sought to share in 4/5ths of whatever royalties Acker con-
tracted for. The appellate court found that the deed was not ambiguous and
that the deed reserved for the nonexecutives a set fraction of production,
being 4/5ths of 1/8th of production. 226
By a second point of error, the nonexecutives claimed that the trial court
erred in considering the overriding royalty interest to be bonus payments
rather than royalties. The appellate court held that questions regarding the
classification of royalty and mineral interest, however, were immaterial to
the instant case.227 Under the partition deed, the nonexecutives parted with
any right to participate in bonuses, rentals, oil payments and production
over and above an undivided 4/5ths of a base 1/8th royalty, thus classifica-
tion of the interest in question was irrelevant.228
Finally, the nonexecutives asserted that Acker breached her duty of ut-
most good faith and fair dealing by obtaining overriding royalties to the ex-
clusion of the nonexecutives. In response, the appellate court noted that
there could be no breach of duty by an executive who receives an overriding
royalty interest where the nonexecutives are entitled to participate only in a
fraction of the production from the property. 229 Likewise, there could be no
conspiracy to deprive the nonexecutives of an interest to which they were
224. Id at 323.
225. Id
226. Id. at 327.
227. Id.
228. Id
229. Id at 328.
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not entitled. 230 Accordingly, the court of appeals affirmed the judgment of
the trial court.231
In Northern Natural Gas Co. v. Vanderburg2 32 the court of appeals con-
strued portions of the Texas Natural Resources Code in determining that a
pipeline purchaser had unlawfully withheld payment of the proceeds of gas
production allocable to a royalty interest.233 In this case, the undisputed
evidence demonstrated that Vanderburg owned the royalty interest under a
1938 oil, gas and mineral lease. Damson claimed title to the gas rights under
the lease and Vanderburg Exploration, Inc. (VEI) claimed title to the oil and
casinghead gas rights under the lease. There were two purported oil wells
and one dry gas well located on the tract. Northern purchased the casing-
head gas under written contract covering the two oil wells operated by VEI
and remitted all payments to VEI. Damson and VEI were involved in litiga-
tion concerning ownership of the gas produced by VEI from the tract and
delivered to Northern under the VEI-Northern contract. Pending resolution
of the title dispute between Damson and VEI, Northern suspended payment
of all proceeds from its purchase of the gas production. Vanderburg re-
quested Northern to make payments of his royalty interest directly to him
because title to his royalty interest was not at issue in the dispute between
Damson and VEI. Northern refused and suit followed.
Among other theories, Vanderburg asserted a cause of action under the
provisions of the Texas Natural Resources Code.234 This statute provides a
mineral interest owner with a cause of action against a payor for the non-
payment of oil or gas proceeds, plus interest and attorneys' fees.235 It was
undisputed that Northern was the purchaser of the gas production from the
wells at issue, and therefore, qualified as a payor within the meaning of the
statute.236 Northern claimed, however, that under the statute, the producer,
rather than the purchaser, is deemed to be the payor if the proceeds derived
from the sale of production have been paid by the purchaser to the producer
and the latter assumes the responsibility of paying those proceeds to the vari-
ous mineral interest owners. Northern further claimed that such an arrange-
ment had been made between it and VEI in this case. The court of appeals
rejected Northern's claim. 237 The court reasoned that for the exception to
apply there must be: 1) a contract between the producer and the purchaser;
230. Id
231. Id
232. 785 S.W.2d 415 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1990, no writ).
233. Id. at 419.
234. Tax. NAT. Rs. CODE ANN. §§ 91.401-.406 (Vernon Supp. 1991).
235. Id § 91.404(c).
236. Payor is defined in the statute as:
the first purchaser of production of oil or gas from an oil or gas well, but the
owner of the right to produce under an oil or gas lease or pooling order is
deemed to be a payor if the owner of the right to produce and the first purchaser
have entered into arrangements providing that the proceeds derived from the
sale of oil or gas have been paid by the first purchaser to the owner who assumes
the responsibility of paying those proceeds to the payee.
TEx. NAT. Ras. CODE ANN. § 91.401(2) (Vernon Supp. 1991).
237. 785 S.W.2d at 419.
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2) payment of the proceeds derived from the sale of production by the pur-
chaser to the producer; and 3) the assumption by the producer of the respon-
sibility to pay the proceeds to the payee.238 Even assuming that the first and
third elements of the exception were satisfied, the court found that the evi-
dence established that Northern did not satisfy the second element because,
as the purchaser of production, it had not paid the proceeds from the sale of
the gas at issue to the producer, VEI.239 As a result, Northern was the
payor under the statutory definition and was not entitled to the benefits of
the exception.24°
Northern further contended that it should not be held liable because it
had not unreasonably delayed payment in violation of section 11.089(b) of
the Texas Natural Resources Code24 1 since the contract between Northern
and VEI authorized Northern to withhold proceeds from the sale of gas in
the event of a title dispute. The court of appeals made short work of this
contention, reasoning that Vanderburg was not bound by the provisions of
the Northern-VEI contract because he was neither a party to nor a third-
party beneficiary of the contract. 24 2 Further, Vanderburg's title was not in
dispute, and therefore, the statutory provision which Northern sought to
assert was not applicable.24 3 Finally, the court observed that Northern had
delayed Vanderburg's royalty payments for four years, which was well be-
yond the sixty-day and ninety-day grace periods provided by the statute244
for delaying such payments.24 5 Under these circumstances, the court con-
cluded that the delay was unreasonable. 246
The issues involved in Hunt v. HNG Oil Co. 247 arose out of claims of a
mineral trespass. The Hunts, as lessors, sued their lessee, HNG, for trespass
and conversion. While an oil and gas lease between the Hunts and HNG
remained in effect, HNG drilled a well on the Hunts' lands. In February
1986, the well was determined to be a dry hole at total depth, thus HNG
plugged back the well to a lesser depth pending a completion attempt in a
shallower zone. The well was ultimately completed in September 1986 as a
producing gas well. It produced gas until July 1987, when it was plugged
and abandoned.
The Hunts claimed that HNG wrongfully entered onto their land and




241. "No common purchaser may unreasonably delay payments to a royalty owner or
landowner or both in purchases of... oil or gas." Tax. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. § 111.089(b)
(Vernon 1978).
242. 785 S.W.2d at 419.
243. Id.
244. The Texas Natural Resources Code requires payment of proceeds to be made no later
than sixty days and ninety days for oil and gas, respectively, following the end of the calendar
month in which such production is sold. See TEx. NAT. REs. CODE ANN. § 91.402(a)
(Vernon Supp. 1991).
245. 785 S.W.2d at 419.
246. Id.
247. 791 S.W.2d 191 (Tex. App.--Corpus Christi 1990, writ denied).
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depth. According to the Hunts, the oil and gas lease expired by its own
terms sixty days after February 8, 1986, the date on which they claimed
HNG ceased operations on the leased premises. Under this reasoning, HNG
was a trespasser when it later completed the well, and thus HNG converted
the Hunts' gas. Following trial, the jury answered all questions in favor of
HNG and the court rendered judgment accordingly.2 48 The Hunts ap-
pealed, contending that they were entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
The Hunts did not, however, challenge the jury's finding of good faith on the
part of HNG when it entered onto the Hunts' lands in September 1986.249
On appeal, HNG asserted that, even if all of the points of error urged by
the Hunts were meritorious, the Hunts could not prevail because they suf-
fered no damages as a matter of law. The appellate court agreed, 250 and
thus did not address the issues of whether the lease had in fact expired and
whether HNG was a good faith trespasser. Instead, the sole issue addressed
by the court was the measure of damages for a defendant's good faith tres-
pass and removal of minerals from a plaintiff's land.
In Bender v. Brooks,251 the leading case in Texas on the measure of dam-
ages for a good faith oil and gas trespass, the Texas Supreme Court adopted
the rule that a good faith trespasser is liable in damages only for the value of
the minerals removed, less drilling and operating costs.25 2 Under Texas law,
the costs and expenses that may be deducted by the good faith trespasser in
usual circumstances include drilling costs, completion costs, production
taxes, transportation charges, operating expenses, and royalties paid to the
lessors.253
This case, however, did not involve usual circumstances. HNG was not a
trespasser when it drilled the well since the well was drilled under a valid
lease.254 The appellate court held that HNG was not entitled to reimburse-
ment of the cost of the initial drilling of the well because it was not a tres-
passer at that time.255 Nevertheless, the total of HNG's other costs and
expenses for which it was entitled to reimbursement exceeded the revenues
from the Hunts' lands.256 Thus, the Hunts could show no harmful error
since they suffered no damages.257
Texas Gas Exploration Corporation v. Broughton Offshore Ltd. II.258 in-
volved the breach of a long-term, offshore drilling contract. In 1981, Texas
Gas, as operator, entered into such a contract with Broughton, as contrac-
.248. Id. at 192.
249. Id at 193.
250. Id
251. 103 Tex. 329, 127 S.W. 168 (1910).
252. Id.; 127 S.W. at 170-71.
253. See Right of Way Oil Co. v. Gladys City Oil, Gas & Mfg. Co., 106 Tex. 94, 157 S.W.
737 (1913); Bender v. Brooks, 103 Tex. 329, 127 S.W. 168 (1910); Mayfield v. de Benavides,
693 S.W.2d 500 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1985, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Dahlstrom Corp. v. Martin,
582 S.W.2d 159 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [ist Dist.] 1979, writ ref'd n.r.e.).




258. 790 S.W.2d 781 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1990, no writ).
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tor. The contract provided for an initial term of two years beginning March
10, 1981, to "continue thereafter for the time required to complete opera-
tions on any well then drilling. ' '259 On March 9, 1983, Broughton was en-
gaged in drilling operations for Texas Gas under the contract. On that date,
Texas Gas ordered Broughton to place a temporary cap on the well, shut
down operations, and move off the location. Thereafter, Texas Gas con-
tracted with another rig to complete drilling operations on the well at a
lower daily rate.
Broughton brought suit against Texas Gas for breach of contract.
Broughton asserted that, under the term provision of the contract, it was
entitled to complete operations on the well. Texas Gas claimed that the
contract expired on March 10, 1983, and would continue only if Texas Gas
elected to have Broughton complete the required drilling on the well. The
court of appeals affirmed the trial court's partial instructed verdict that
Texas Gas breached the drilling contract as a matter of law.26°
The court noted that if the parties to the contract had intended for Texas
Gas to have the option on March 10, 1983, to determine whether Broughton
would be permitted to complete the drilling of a well, they would have ex-
pressed such intent in the contract. 26' The term provision of the contract,
however, was expressed in mandatory language. 262 To accept Texas Gas'
interpretation of the contract would be to render such language meaning-
less.2 63 According to the court, the contract was unambiguous: "if Texas
Gas chose to continue operations on the well, it must [have] allowed
Broughton to continue the work."'264 The evidence established that Texas
Gas always intended to complete the drilling of the well.265 Accordingly,
the court held that Texas Gas breached the contract by ordering Broughton
to demobilize and then completing the well with a different drilling
contractor.26
6
B & A Pipeline Co. v. Dorney267 arose out of a dispute under a farmout
agreement and two gas purchase contracts. On May 10, 1982, Henderson
Clay Products (HCP) entered into an agreement to sell gas to B & A Pipe-
line. This gas purchase contract provided that HCP would sell and deliver
to B & A natural gas produced from leases that HCP then held or later
acquired within a certain defined area. The contract required B & A to take
or pay for 85% of the delivery capacity of the wells on the contract acreage.
The next day, B & A entered into a gas contract with Lone Star Gas Com-
pany whereby B & A dedicated its marketable interest in gas produced from
the same contract acreage covered by the May 10 contract. The May 11
259. Id. at 784.
260. Id.
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267. 904 F.2d 996 (5th Cir. 1990).
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contract obligated Lone Star to take or pay for 85% of the delivery capabil-
ity of the wells in the contract acreage.
Dorney held leases in the contract area covered by the gas purchase con-
tracts. During the period that the gas contracts were being negotiated, Dor-
ney and a representative of HCP entered into a tentative farmout agreement
under which HCP would market the gas from Dorney's acreage. This agree-
ment was finalized in November 1982. It provided, among other things, that
Dorney had the right to share in a proportionate part of any payments made
for gas not actually taken. Under the agreement, Dorney retained the right
to take his gas in kind.
In 1985, B & A sued Lone Star for breach of the May 11 gas contract
seeking recovery under the take-or-pay provision. Dorney intervened in the
lawsuit claiming entitlement to his proportionate share of any take-or-pay
payments. The parties to the lawsuit other than Dorney settled the dispute
in 1988. Under the terms of the settlement, the gas contract was amended to
require Lone Star to purchase greater quantities of gas at a price in excess of
the then prevailing market price. No take-or-pay payments were made
under the settlement agreement. Following the settlement, B & A and HCP
amended the May 10 gas contract to include a dedication provision pertain-
ing to specific wells, rather than the general acreage provisions under the
original contract, and to delete B & A's take-or-pay obligation.
Dorney amended his petition in intervention, asserting claims against B &
A for, among other things, breach of its obligations to Dorney under the
May 11 contract and for fraud by falsely promising to prosecute its take-or-
pay claims against Lone Star for Dorney's benefit. The district court
granted summary judgment for the defendants, and the Fifth Circuit
affirmed.268
As to Dorney's breach of contract claims, Dorney admitted that he was
not a party to the contract between Lone Star and B & A. Nevertheless, he
claimed that B & A was obligated to him under the contract because his gas
was dedicated to Lone Star by B & A. The court, however, found that
Dorney's gas was not dedicated under the contract as a matter of law.269
"[W]hen a gas well owner reserves the right to take the production of the
well in kind, the production of that well is not dedicated. '270
The court found that Dorney's claim for fraud was likewise without
merit. 271 Dorney failed to show that he relied on any promise by B & A that
it would prosecute the take-or-pay claims against Lone Star for his bene-
fit.2 72 Indeed, the court noted that Dorney's intervention in the lawsuit il-
lustrated that there was no such reliance.273
Noble Exploration v. Nixon Drilling Co. 2 7 4 involved an action against a
268. Id. at 997.
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drilling company by the owner of the leasehold estate seeking a judicial dec-
laration that the drilling company's lien affidavit was invalid and seeking
removal of cloud on its title created by the lien affidavit. The trial court
rendered a take-nothing judgment, and the leaseholder appealed. 27 5 The ap-
pellate court reversed, and rendered in part, and remanded in part.
Anthony Exploration Company, Noble's predecessor in interest, obtained
an oil, gas and mineral lease on a certain 101-acre lease tract and entered
into a farmout agreement with Nobleson Operating Company. Under the
terms of the farmout agreement, Anthony agreed to assign the working in-
terest under the lease to Nobleson (subject to a reservation of an overriding
royalty interest) if Nobleson drilled and completed a commercially produc-
tive well on forty acres of the tract. Nobleson thereafter entered into a drill-
ing contract with Nixon for the drilling of a well on the tract. Although
Nixon drilled a well, the well was not completed as a commercial producer,
and thus Nobleson failed to pay Nixon for its services. Nixon filed lien affi-
davits in the county records purporting to secure a lien as to the forty acres
surrounding the well. Anthony then brought suit against Nixon. Prior to
trial, Anthony assigned its interest in the lease to Noble and Noble was sub-
stituted as the real party plaintiff.
Noble appealed the granting of the take-nothing judgment, claiming that
the evidence established as a matter of law that Nixon improperly secured a
lien against Noble's leasehold estate because there was no contract between
Nixon and Noble, or Noble's trustee, agent, or receiver. 276 Nixon claimed
that Nobleson was Anthony's agent, and that there was an implied contract
between Nixon and Anthony. These arguments were based on the existence
of the farmout agreement between Anthony and Nobleson at the time
Nobleson contracted with Nixon.
With regard to Nixon's claim of an implied contract, the court of appeals
held that there could be no contract implied in fact between Nixon and
Anthony because there was no mutual agreement between them.27 7 There
was no contract implied in law because there was no representation to Nixon
that Nobleson was a mineral property owner.278 Indeed, the court held that
Nixon was charged with constructive notice of the information contained in
the public records that Anthony was the mineral property owner.27 9 Addi-
tionally, the court found that there could be no implied contract in light of
the express contract between Nobleson and Nixon.280
As to Nixon's claim of agency between Anthony and Nobleson, the court
275. Id. at 590.
276. The Texas Property Code provides that "[a] mineral contractor or subcontractor has a
lien to secure payments for labor or services relating to mineral activities." TEX. PROP. CODE
ANN. § 56.002 (Vernon 1984). The term mineral contractor is defined as "a person who per-
forms labor or furnishes or hauls material, machinery, or supplies used in mineral activities
under an express or implied contract with a mineral property owner or with a trustee, agent, or
receiver of a mineral property owner." TEx. PROP. CODE ANN. § 56.001(2) (Vernon 1984).
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of appeals found no evidence that Nobleson acted on behalf of Anthony or
was subject to Anthony's control or that Anthony and Nobleson consented
to such an arrangement. 281 Nor was there any evidence of conduct from
which an agency arrangement could be implied.282
Having found no evidence that would support the implied findings of the
trial court, the court of appeals found that the evidence established as a mat-
ter of law that Nixon was not a "mineral contractor" and was not entitled to
a mineral lien under the applicable provisions of the Texas Property
Code.283 Accordingly, the court of appeals reversed the trial court's judg-
ment, rendered judgment invalidating the lien and removing any cloud on
Noble's title created by the filing of such lien, and remanded the case in part
to the trial court for proceedings to determine damages and fees, if any, to
which Noble was entitled.284 W & W Oil Co. v. Capps285 also involved a
situation where a contractor was not paid for goods and services furnished to
a farmee under a farmout agreement. In 1985, W & W and Sam Hooper, as
owners of a certain leasehold estate, entered into a farmout agreement with
Devonian Corporation. At Devonian's request, Capps furnished goods and
performed services in connection with Devonian's operations on the lease.
Capps had no knowledge of the farmout agreement. Devonian failed to pay
Capps for the goods and services. Likewise, W & W was not paid by Devo-
nian for the farmout agreement and thus W & W exercised its right under
the agreement to terminate Devonian's interest and resume control of the
lease. Capps brought suit against Devonian and W & W on a variety of
causes of action. Devonian never answered the lawsuit or appeared in court.
W & W claimed that it was not liable to Capps because Capps provided the
goods and services solely for, and at the instance of, Devonian. Neverthe-
less, the trial court rendered judgment for Capps against W & W on the
theory of quantum meruit.28 6
On appeal, W & W claimed that the trial court erred in granting judgment
for Capps on the theory of quantum meruit because a valid, express contract
existed. The court noted that, as a general rule, where there is a valid ex-
press contract covering the subject matter, there can be no implied con-
tract.287 This rule applies not only when the plaintiff is seeking to recover in
quantum meruit from the party with whom he has expressly contracted, but
also in a situation where the plaintiff is seeking to recover from a third party
who benefitted from the performance, as in this case.288 Since the evidence
conclusively established the existence of an express contract between Devo-
nian and Capps for the performance of services and payment therefore, the
281. Id
282. IAd
283. Id at 593.
284. Id
285. 784 S.W.2d 536 (Tex. App.-Tyler 1990, no writ).
286. Id at 537.
287. Id (citing Woodard v. Southwest States, Inc., 384 S.W.2d 674 (Tex. 1964)).
288. Id (citing Black Lake Pipe Line Co. v. Union Const. Co., 538 S.W.2d 80 (Tex. 1976),
overr. on other grounds, 767 S.W.2d 686 (Tex. 1989)).
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court limited Capps to recovery on the express contract. 289 The appellate
court therefore reversed the trial court's judgment against W & W based on
quantum meruit.290
289. Id.
290. Id. at 538.
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